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ARTICLES
ULTRA VIRES AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
PAUL CRAIG*
THERE is a growing literature concerning the role of the ultra vires
doctrine and its place within administrative law. For some the
doctrine is the central principle of administrative law, without which
judicial intervention would rest on uncertain foundations.1 For
others, it constitutes at best a harmless fiction, which is incapable of
explaining all instances of judicial intervention, and at worst a device
which allows the judiciary to conceal the real justifications for
developments in judicial review.2 Christopher Forsyth falls into the
former camp. He has written a vigorous defence of the ultra vires
principle, contending that "it remains vital to the developed law of
judicial review". 3 The purpose of this article is to contribute to the
debate on this issue by putting the opposing view. The article will be
divided into four sections.
The first section will draw together the criticisms of the ultra
vires principle. More specifically it will be argued that it is
indeterminate, unrealistic, beset by internal tension, and that it
cannot explain all instances where the judiciary has applied public
law principles. The second and third sections will consider the
arguments of those who believe that the ultra vires principle is indeed
central to administrative law. Christopher Forsyth has helpfully
articulated this position and has contended that certain undesirable
consequences would ensue if we were to rest judicial intervention on
Professor of Law, Worcester College, Oxford. I am grateful for the comments of Jack Beatson,
Mark Freedland, Elizabeth Fisher, Sir John Laws, Dawn Oliver and Sir Stephen Sedley.
I remain responsible for all errors.
Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law (7th ed., 1994), p. 41; Forsyth, "Of Fig Leaves and Fairy
Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, The Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review" [1996]
C.L.J. 122.
Oliver, "Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial Review?" [19871 P.L. 543; Craig,
Administrative Law (3rd ed., 1994), pp. 12-17; Sir John Laws, "Illegality: The Problem of
Jurisdiction", in Supperstone and Goudie (eds.), Judicial Review (1992), p. 67; Lord Woolf,
"Droit Public-English Style" [1995] P.L. 57 at 66.
3 Forsyth, op. cit. n. 1, p. 122.
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any other ground. It will be argued that these fears are misplaced
and that those who are opposed to the ultra vires principle would
not be forced to accept such undesirable consequences. The final
section will develop the analysis in two related ways. It will be
argued from an historical perspective that judicial intervention was
not posited on the idea of effectuating the intent of the legislature,
and that therefore to regard this as the classic theory underpinning
judicial review is misconceived. It will be further argued from a
conceptual perspective that it is possible to provide an alternative
justification for judicial review which is sound, which fits with the
seminal case law on the foundations of judicial review and which
captures the proper relationship between the courts and the
administration in a constitutional democracy.
It should be made clear at the outset that this article does not
seek to address criticisms of the ultra vires principle which amount
to direct challenges to the sovereignty of Parliament, what
Christopher Forsyth terms "strong" criticisms of the principle.' This
is not because I disagree with such criticisms of the ultra vires
principle. It is rather simply because of lack of space: discussion of
sovereignty, and of possible changes to what is commonly perceived
as the traditional doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, is a complex
topic in its own right.'
It should also be made clear that references to judicial review
refer to the substantive and procedural norms which comprise this
topic, and not to the way in which a remedy is obtained.
I. THE CRITICISMS OF THE ULTRA VIREs DOCTRINE
The precise meaning of the ultra vires principle is, as will be
seen below, more complex and contentious than is commonly
acknowledged. This section of the article will, however, accept the
meaning of the principle which is adopted by those who are minded
to defend it as the only viable basis for judicial review in this
country. The core idea can be expressed as follows.
The ultra vires principle is based on the assumption that judicial
review is legitimated on the ground that the courts are applying the
intent of the legislature. Parliament has found it necessary to accord
power to ministers, administrative agencies, local authorities and the
like. Such power will always be subject to certain conditions
Ibid. pp. 127-129.
My own views on this topic can be found in "Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament
after Factortamne" (1991) 11 Y.B.E.L. 221 and "Public Law, Sovereignty and Citizenship", in
Blackburn (ed.), Rights of Citizenship (1993), chap. 16. Further development of these ideas can
be found in "Three Conceptions of Sovereignty" forthcoming.
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contained in the enabling legislation. The courts' function is to police
the boundaries stipulated by Parliament. The ultra vires principle
was used to achieve this end in two related ways. In a narrow sense
it captured the idea that the relevant agency must have the legal
capacity to act in relation to the topic in question: an institution
given power by Parliament to adjudicate on employment matters
should not take jurisdiction over non-employment matters. In a
broader sense the ultra vires principle has been used as the vehicle
through which to impose a number of constraints on the way in
which the power given to the agency has been exercised: it must
comply with rules of fair procedure, it must exercise its discretion to
attain proper and not improper purposes, it must not act
unreasonably etc.
The ultra vires principle thus conceived provided both the basis
for judicial intervention and also established its limits. Judicial
intervention was increasingly posited on the idea that the objective
was to ensure that the agency did remain within the area assigned to
it by Parliament. The limits to judicial review were also profoundly
affected by the ultra vires principle. If the agency was within its
assigned area then it was prima facie performing the tasks entrusted
to it by the legislature and hence not contravening the will of
Parliament. Controls over the way in which the agency exercised its
discretionary power had, therefore, to be framed with this in mind.
The courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the
agency. The controls over the way in which discretionary power was
exercised were, moreover, justified by reference to legislative intent:
it would be argued, for example, that Parliament did not intend the
agency to make decisions based on irrelevant considerations or
improper purposes.
The ultra vires principle is thus regarded as both a necessary and
sufficient basis for judicial intervention. It is necessary in the sense
that any ground of judicial review has to be fitted into the ultra vires
doctrine in order for it to be acceptable. It is sufficient in the sense
that if such a ground of review can be so fitted into the ultra vires
principle it obviates the need for further independent inquiry.
When reading the criticisms of the ultra vires principle set out
below it is important to bear two related points in mind in order to
avoid confusion. One is that those who are critical of the ultra vires
principle as the foundation of judicial review are not committed in
any sense to regarding legislative intent as being irrelevant in
determining the extent and incidence of such review. It is self-evident
that the enabling legislation must be considered when determining
the ambit of a body's powers. This is not, however, the same thing
as saying that the heads of review, their meaning or the intensity
C.L.J.
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with which they are applied can be justified by reference to legislative
intent. The other point to bear in mind is that critics of the ultra
vires principle are of course concerned to keep bodies within their
assigned spheres. The central issue is how far the relevant legal rules
and their application can be satisfactorily explained by reference to
legislative intent.
(a) The Indeterminacy of the Ultra Vires Principle
One potent critique of the ultra vires principle is its very
indeterminacy. This can be exemplified by its application to judicial
review of jurisdictional issues such as those presented in cases such
as Bolton,6 Brittain,7 Anisminic8 or Page.9 A statute states, for
example, that if an employee is injured at work then an agency may
or shall grant compensation. It is clear from the face of the
legislation that there are three conditions which must be satisfied
before the agency can proceed further: the existence of an employee,
an injury and the fact that the injury has occurred while at work.
It is indisputable as a matter of legal history that the courts in
this country have adopted a number of different approaches to
defining jurisdictional error. These have been considered in detail
elsewhere," but suffice it to say for the present that three such
approaches can be detected within the courts' jurisprudence: limited
review, the collateral fact doctrine and the more modern test of
extensive review under which all relevant errors of law are open to
challenge.
It is equally indisputable that the ultra vires doctrine provides no
guidance as such as to which of these standards of review ought to
be applied. It does not tell us whether the correct standard of judicial
review should be for the court to substitute judgment on the meaning
of each of these conditions, or whether it should substitute judgment
on certain of the conditions but not others, or whether it should
adopt some other test. Any of these tests can be formally reconciled
with the ultra vires principle. It can always be maintained that, for
example, Parliament only intended that certain preliminary issues
should be subject to judicial review, or by way of contrast that
Parliament intended that the ordinary courts should substitute
judgment on all relevant questions of law for that of the agency
being reviewed. Courts which have been eager to promote a
6 R. v. Bolton (1841) 1 Q.B. 66.
Brittain v. Kinnaird (1819) 1 B. & B. 432.
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [19691 2 A.C. 147.
R. v. Lord President of the Privy Council, ex p. Page [1993] 2 A.C. 682.
TO Craig, Administrative Law (3rd ed., 1994), Chap. 10.
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particular doctrine of jurisdictional error have sought to validate
their chosen view by invoking Parliamentary intent in this manner."
The flexibility in the ultra vires principle can preserve the veneer
that the courts are simply obeying the legislative mandate, but it is
this very flexibility which ultimately robs the reasoning of any
conviction. It is precisely because legislative intent can be used to
legitimate almost all types of judicial control that it loses its potency
to legitimate any particular one."2 As Sir John Laws has remarked, 3
the ultra vires principle in this area is simply a fig leaf which enables
the courts to intervene to the degree to which they think is
appropriate without too nakedly confronting the authority of the
executive. How far the courts ought to be intervening in this area
and the factors which are of relevance in this respect will be
considered in more detail below. The ultra vires principle is capable
of accommodating a variety of conclusions on this issue. It is not
however able to provide any independent ex ante guidance.
(b) The Lack of Reality of the Ultra Vires Principle
Another telling criticism of the ultra vires doctrine is that it does not
accord with reality. This can be exemplified by considering the
controls which the courts have imposed on the exercise of discretion.
The orthodox approach has been to legitimate these controls by
reference to Parliamentary intent: the legislature only intended such
power to be exercised on the basis of relevant considerations,
reasonably and for proper purposes. There are two problems with
this rationalisation of judicial behaviour.
First, the legislation which is in issue in a particular case will
often not provide any detailed guide to the courts as to the
application of these controls on discretion. There will be often be
scant guidance to be gained from the enabling legislation as to what
should be considered to be relevant as opposed to irrelevant
considerations. Nor is it realistic to think of the legislative process
being conducted in these terms. 4 This is particularly so in relation
to legislation which is framed in broad, open textured terms. The
court will of necessity have to make its own considered judgment on
such matters.
See, e.g., R. v. Commissioners for Special Purposes ofIncome Tax (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313; Colonial
Bank of Australasia v. Willan (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 417; Page [1993] 2 A.C. 682.
12 It is, moreover, even more difficult to conceive of intervention in this area being based on
legislative intent determining the limits of validity if the courts employ a functional as opposed
to an analytical sense of the term "error of law". See generally, J. Beatson, "The Scope of
Judicial Review for Error of Law" (1984) 4 O.J.L.S. 22.
1 "Illegality: The Problem of Jurisdiction", in Supperstone and Goudie (eds.), Judicial Review
(1992), Chap. 4.
14 Sir Stephen Sedley, "The Common Law and the Constitution", in Lord Nolan and Sir Stephen
Sedley, The Making and Remaking of the British Constitution (1998), p. 16.
C.L.J.
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Secondly, the orthodox justification for the controls which exist
on discretion makes little if any sense when we consider the
development of these controls across time. The constraints which
exist on the exercise of discretionary power are not static. Existing
constraints evolve and new types of control are added to the judicial
armoury. Changes in judicial attitudes towards fundamental rights,
the acceptance of legitimate expectations, and the possible inclusion
of proportionality as a head of review in its own right are but three
examples of this process. These developments cannot plausibly be
explained by reference to legislative intent. Let us imagine that, for
example, the UK courts were to decide in 1998 that proportionality
was an independent head of review. Can it plausibly be maintained
that this is to be justified by reference to changes in legislative intent
which occurred at this time? Would the legislature in some manner
have indicated that it intended a new generalised head of review in
1998 which had not existed hitherto? The question only has to be
posed for the answer to be self-evident.15 Sir John Laws captures this
point when speaking of developments in judicial review,16
They are, categorically, judicial creations. They owe neither their
existence nor their acceptance to the will of the legislature. They
have nothing to do with the intention of Parliament, save as a
fig leaf to cover their true origins. We do not need the fig leaf
any more.
(c) Tensions within the Ultra Vires Principle
A further problem with the ultra vires doctrine is that it is beset by
internal tensions. These are most apparent in the context of statutory
provisions which seek to exclude the courts from judicial review
through the presence of preclusive or finality clauses. If the rationale
for judicial review is that the courts are thereby implementing
legislative intent this leads to difficulty where the legislature has
stated in clear terms that it does not wish the courts to intervene
with the decisions made by the agency. As is well known such clauses
have not in fact served to exclude judicial review. The courts have
used a number of interpretative techniques to limit the effect of such
clauses, most notably in Anisminic"7 where their Lordships held that
, The same point can of course be made about other developments which have occurred in
judicial review. For example, the expansion of the head of jurisdictional error cannot plausibly
be explained by changes in legislative intent which occurred at the time of the decision in Page
[1993] 2 A.C. 682.
" Law and Democracy" [1995] P.L. 72 at 79.
17 [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
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the relevant provision did not serve to protect decisions which were
nullities.
Various attempts can and have been made to square such
decisions with the orthodox ultra vires principle. It might be argued
that Parliament really did not intend such clauses to cover decisions
which could otherwise be rendered null. It might alternatively be
contended that Parliament acquiesced in the actual decision reached
by the courts in the instant case. It might be further argued that in
the future Parliament would know that any such clause would be
interpreted in this manner and that it signalled its consent in this
respect by its willingness to include such clauses in legislation while
being fully cognisant of their limited legal effect.
While such arguments can be made they are susceptible to two
complementary objections, one substantive, the other formal.
In substantive terms, arguments of this nature should not be
allowed to conceal the reality of what the legislature was attempting
to achieve, nor should it be allowed to mask the judicial response.
Such clauses were clearly designed to exclude the courts. This might
be for a "legitimate" reason, in the sense that the legislature was
merely trying to signal that it preferred the view of a specialist
agency to that of the reviewing court. It might be for a more
"dubious" reason, as where the legislature was merely seeking to
immunise the decisions of a minister from any challenge. We should
be equally honest about the nature of the courts' response. Although
it is capable of being reconciled with orthodoxy in the above manner,
the reality is that the courts were reaching their decision by drawing
upon a constitutional principle independent of Parliamentary intent.
The essence of this principle was that access to judicial review, and
the protections which it provides, should be safeguarded by the
courts, and that any legislative attempt to block such access should
be given the most restrictive reading possible, irrespective of whether
this truly accorded with legislative intent or not.
The other objection to the arguments made above is more formal
in nature. Even if one believes that the decisions in this area can be
reconciled with ultra vires orthodoxy this reconciliation is only
bought at a price. The price in this instance is the straining of the
ultra vires doctrine itself. The malleability of the doctrine allows it
to be formally stretched in the above manner. Yet the more contrived
the search for the legitimation of legislative intent, the more strained
and implausible does the whole ultra vires doctrine become. This
tension has indeed been exacerbated by more recent developments in
judicial review. The House of Lords in Anisminic could at least
contend that there was some space left for the ouster clause to
operate on, given that they held that the concept of error of law
C.L.J.
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within jurisdiction still existed. The death knell of the idea of non-
jurisdictional error of law which was sounded in Page"t has removed
this line of argument.
(d) The Ultra Vires Principle and the Scope of Public Law
For all its difficulties it is at least plausible to think of the ultra vires
principle as being the basis of judicial review in relation to those
bodies which derive their power from statute. The courts have,
however, expanded the principles of judicial review to cover
institutions which are not public bodies in the traditional sense of
the term, in circumstances where these bodies do not derive their
power from statute or the prerogative. This trend has been more
marked as of late because of reforms in the law of remedies. 9 It
would none the less be mistaken to think of this as a recent
development. The courts have applied public law, or analogous,
principles to such bodies for a very considerable period of time,
irrespective of whether this was in the context of an action for
judicial review as such. Trade associations, trade unions and
corporations with de facto monopoly power have, for example, been
subject to some of the same principles as are applied to public bodies
stricto sensu
20
It is difficult to apply the ultra vires principle to such bodies
without substantially altering its meaning.2 These bodies do not
derive their power from statute and therefore judicial control cannot
be rationalised through the idea that the courts are delineating the
boundaries of Parliament's intent. The very language of ultra vires
can only be preserved by transforming it so as to render the
principles of judicial review of generalised application to those
institutions which wield a certain degree of power; these principles
are then read into the articles of association or other governing
document under which the body operates. While this step can be
taken it serves to transform the ultra vires doctrine. It can no longer
be regarded as the vehicle through which the courts effectuate the
will of Parliament. It becomes rather a juristic device through which
these private or quasi-public bodies are subject to the controls which
the courts believe should operate on those who possess a certain type
of power.
' [1993] 2 A.C. 682.
Craig, op. cit. n. 10, Chap. 15.
0 On some occasions the courts will justify this by reference to the supposed intent of the relevant
parties; on others, they will impose the relevant obligation without reference to the parties'
intent, see generally, D. Oliver, "Common Values in Public and Private Law and the Public
Private Divide" [1997] P.L. 630.
2 Oliver, op. cit. n. 2.
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II. THE DEFENCE OF THE ULTRA VIRES PRINCIPLE: THE DANGERS OF
ITS ABANDONMENT
It is unsurprising, given the nature of these criticisms, that there
should have been a defence of the ultra vires principle and
Christopher Forsyth has made a valuable contribution to the debate
by articulating this point of view. His defence in effect entails two
complementary lines of analysis: one set of arguments is designed to
show the dangers of abandoning the ultra vires principle; the other
is designed to address and meet some of the criticisms of that
principle. The first set of arguments will be considered within this
section; the second in the section which follows.22
(a) The Particular Danger.- Ouster Clauses
One of the primary arguments advanced by Forsyth23 is that if we
abandon the ultra vires principle the courts will be unable to
circumvent ouster clauses in the manner which they have done in
cases such as Anisminic.
The argument is based on the decision of the South African court
in the UDF case.24 The case concerned judicial review of emergency
regulations made by the State President which were designed to
prevent the dissemination of information about "unrest". The UDF
sought to challenge these regulations on the ground that the
definition of unrest was so vague as to render the regulations void.
The regulations were protected by an ouster clause, which would not
have served to immunise them from attack had the court employed
the type of reasoning used in cases such as Anisminic.
Rabie A.C.J. who gave the majority judgment in the Appellate
Division of the South African court reasoned, however, that even if
the regulations were vague they were still made pursuant to the legis-
lation and hence still protected by the ouster clause. Rabie A.C.J.
also rejected the ultra vires doctrine as the basis of judicial review,
holding that it was Roman-Dutch common law and not the ultra
vires doctrine which required that subordinate legislation should not
be vague. While such regulations could in theory be struck down by
the court in the exercise of these common law powers, the regulations
were still made "under the Act" and thus were protected by the
ouster clause.
Forsyth contends that if we abandoned the ultra vires doctrine
then such results could happen here too, and that the reasoning
22 It should be pointed out for the sake of clarity that this method of dividing Christopher
Forsyth's argument is mine and not his.
23 Forsyth, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 129-133.
24 Staatpresident en andere v. United Democratic Front en 'n ander 1988(4) S.A. 830A.
C.L.J.
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adopted by Rabie A.C.J. could be applied even if the ground of
challenge was irrationality, procedural impropriety, or abuse of
power. An ouster clause could operate to immunise such errors from
attack. Judicial review would in Forsyth's words be "eviscerated"
and this would be "the inevitable consequence of abandoning ultra
vires", even though it was not the intended consequence.25
Christopher Forsyth is clearly correct to alert us to the reasoning
used in the UDF case, and to point out the consequences of
abandoning the ultra vires principle which occurred in that case. The
reasoning of Rabie A.C.J. is indisputable. It happened. It could
therefore happen in another legal system which chose to reject the
ultra vires principle.
Forsyth is however mistaken in contending that this is the
inevitable consequence of abandoning the ultra vires principle, or
even the likely consequence. The argument posits a link between the
abandonment of the ultra vires doctrine and the treatment of ouster
clauses which does not in reality exist. Let us imagine that a court is
minded to abandon the ultra vires doctrine as the basis of judicial
review and to maintain instead that the controls on the exercise of
public power are based not on the will of Parliament, but rather on
common law created doctrines and principles. It is important to
recognise at this juncture that these common law created doctrines
and principles will include not only the established heads of review,
but also other principles of public law which are relevant, for
example, to the treatment of fundamental rights and indeed ouster
clauses. How does such a judge deal with a case in which there is an
ouster clause? Is he or she forced to reason in the manner exemplified
by Rabie A.C.J. and hold that the clause protects errors which
would otherwise be susceptible to challenge under one of the
established heads of review? No. Such a judge would reason as
follows.
The judge would begin by making explicit and honest what is
implicit in the current approach of the courts to ouster clauses. The
limited effect to be given to such clauses would not be based on the
strained idea that Parliament did not intend such clauses to protect
nullities. It would rather be based on what is in any event the reality
underlying the current law in this area. This is the existence of a
common law constitutional principle to the effect that the inherent
power of the courts should not readily be taken to be wholly
excluded from review, a principle recognised and forcefully expressed
by Professor Wade.26 A clause which purported to do this would
5 Forsyth, op. cit. n. 1, p. 131.
26 See, H.W.R. Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (1980), p. 66, stating that Parliament's attempts
to exempt public bodies from the jurisdiction of the courts is tantamount to giving them
[1998]
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therefore be restrictively construed so as to apply only to decisions
which were not vitiated by errors of the kind which could be
challengeable under standard heads of review. A court could
therefore in a case such as UDF or Anisminic proceed to consider
the alleged error and strike down the regulations or government
action if the error were proven to exist.
A final point on this topic is warranted here. Not only is the
approach adopted in the UDF case not the logical or necessary
consequence of abandoning the ultra vires principle. We should also
recognise that the result reached in Anisminic was not a foregone
conclusion, in some way logically derived from the very use of the
ultra vires principle. In other words the mere fact that a legal system
does employ the ultra vires principle does not mean that it will
necessarily use it to interpret ouster clauses in the manner adopted
by the House of Lords. We have already seen the strain which this
very approach placed upon the ultra vires doctrine itself.
(b) The General Danger: The Analytical Impasse?
The second perceived danger of abandoning the ultra vires principle
is captured in the following quotation from Christopher Forsyth's
article. 7
Suppose that a Minister in the apparent exercise of a statutory
power to make regulations, makes certain regulations which are
clearly so vague that their meaning cannot be determined with
sufficient certainty. Classic theory tells us that Parliament never
intends to grant the power to make vague regulations-this
seems an entirely reasonable and realistic intention to impute to
Parliament-and thus the vague regulations are ultra vires and
void: there would be no difficulty in the court striking down the
regulations. But classic theory has been abandoned: the grounds
of review derive, not from the implied intent of the legislature,
but from the common law. It follows that although the
regulations are intra vires the minister's powers, they are none
the less invalid because they are vague.
The analytical difficulty is this: what an all powerful
Parliament does not prohibit, it must authorise either expressly
or impliedly Thus, if the making of the vague regulations is
within the powers granted by a sovereign Parliament, on what
basis may the courts challenge Parliament's will and hold that
the regulations are invalid?
The argument in this quotation is powerfully presented. It should
dictatorial power and is a constitutional abuse of power by Parliament; that judicial control
over discretionary power is a constitutional fundamental, akin to an entrenched constitutional
provision, p. 68; and that it ought not to be left to Whitehall to say how much judicial control
will or will not be tolerated, p. 70.
27 Forsyth, op. cit. n. I, p. 133.
C.L.J.
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be noted at the outset that no such analytical impasse has ever in
fact been perceived by the courts which developed review and did so
independently of ideas of legislative intent. The argument must none
the less be answered by those who seek to challenge the ultra vires
principle as the basis of judicial review. It is however capable of
being met.
The fact that some might choose to reject the ultra vires doctrine
based on legislative intent as the justification for judicial review does
not for any reason mean that the limits to an agency's powers
thereby alter. The argument as put thus elides the existence of limits
to an agency's power with the conceptual basis for those limits. The
limit on power is that regulations should not be too vague, but it
might equally be that they should not be manifestly unreasonable,28
or that they should be interpreted so as not to infringe fundamental
rights29 etc. The live issue is whether one believes that such limits are
really to be derived from legislative intent or more honestly from
judicial creation through the process of the common law. Under the
latter approach one would simply say that there is a common law
principle that regulations cannot be too vague, that statutes which
empower the making of regulations will be read subject to this
principle and therefore that the minister did not have power to make
such vague regulations.
It is no answer in this respect to state that what an all powerful
Parliament does not prohibit it must authorise either expressly or
impliedly. This is not in reality a problem. The orthodox reading of
the ultra vires principle is itself based on the assumption that
Parliament will be presumed not to have intended the making of
regulations which are vague, unreasonable etc. The presumption is
therefore that vague or unreasonable regulations are prohibited.
There is no substantive difference in this respect with the alternative
conceptual basis for judicial review, which sees the heads of review
based on the common law. On this view there would be a ;common
law presumption that the common law proscription against the
making of vague or unreasonable regulations could be operative, and
hence such regulations would be prohibited, unless there was some
very clear indication from Parliament to the contrary.
Now of course if Parliament were to state explicitly in the
enabling legislation that the minister should be thus empowered then
judicial review would be correspondingly curtailed. But this would
be equally true irrespective of whether one perceived review to be
based upon legislative intent or the common law. If it were the
s Kruse v. Johnson [1898] 2 Q.B. 91; MeEldowney v. Forde [1971] A.C. 632.
29 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Leech [1993] 4 All E.R. 539.
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former, and assuming that the courts really were seeking to apply
such intent, then the minister would be empowered to make vague
regulations. If the principles of review were seen to be based on the
common law then these could be overridden by legislation which was
sufficiently clearly phrased and which was inconsistent with the
common law norm, unless of course one chose to mount a direct or
"strong" challenge to the sovereignty of Parliament.
(c) The Symbolic Argument: The Utility of Fig-Leaves
Christopher Forsyth reinforces his analysis with an argument of a
more symbolic nature. He takes Sir John Laws to task for
misunderstanding the fig-leaf metaphor. The point about the fig-leaf
metaphor is, says Forsyth, precisely that fig-leaves "do not deceive
anyone as to what lies beneath them".3" The fig-leaf, "like the swim-
ming costume on a crowded beach, is to preserve the decencies". 3
On this view the ultra vires doctrine plays a similar role in public
law: while no one is so innocent as to deny the existence of judicial
creativity in this area, the ultra vires doctrine serves to preserve the
proper balance of power and the correct formal relationship between
the judiciary and Parliament.
This is an interesting argument which undoubtedly contains an
element of truth. There are however two counter arguments which
are of relevance here.
The first is that the argument assumes a particular vision of the
relationship between courts and Parliament, with the ultra vires
doctrine based on legislative intent as the constitutional justification
for judicial review. It is by no means self-evidently correct as the
discussion in the last section of this article will reveal.
Secondly, we should in any event be mindful of the "costs" of
the strategy which Forsyth advocates: fig-leaves are not harmless and
do in fact naturally lead to concealment as to the proper basis for
developments in judicial review. This can be exemplified by the
changes in the law of jurisdictional error. The courts have, as we
have seen, shifted ground on this issue over the years, moving from
a doctrine of limited review, to the collateral fact doctrine and on to
the present position which renders all relevant errors of law open to
challenge. It is, at present, all too easy for the courts when minded
to develop the law in a particular direction simply to "justify" this
by some general invocation of legislative intent. Thus courts have
said that they should, for example, review all errors of law because
Parliament intends all such questions of law to be decided by the
Forsyth, op. cit. n. 1, p. 136.
31 Loc. cit.
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ordinary courts. Similar formal reliance on legislative intent served
to justify the earlier legal positions on this topic.
This invocation of mystical legislative intent serves to conceal the
much richer set of issues which are really at stake in this area
concerning the appropriate balance of power between courts and
agencies. It leaves entirely unanswered a whole series of significant
questions. Why did the courts in the eighteenth, nineteenth and
twentieth century persist with the other more limited doctrines of
jurisdictional error? Was it simply because they felt in some way
analytically constrained to do so? Was it because they were in some
way under a mistaken impression about the possible limits of judicial
intervention in this area? A close reading of the case law in this area
would indicate a negative answer to all of these questions.32
Alternative doctrines of jurisdictional error were based rather on
differing views about the proper balance of power between courts
and agencies when interpreting the conditions of jurisdiction.
Although this can be divined from some of the court's jurisprudence,
many of the cases were simply content to rest their chosen conclusion
behind the impenetrable formalism of legislative intent. The contrast
between the level of judicial debate on this topic in Canada or the
USA as opposed to the UK is marked indeed. The case law in these
countries is replete with explicit judicial discussion of the real issues
which do and should affect the legal doctrine which is applied in this
area.33 The outcome of such judicial discourse might be the same as
the legal status quo as expressed in the Page decision. It might not.
The answer either way is irrelevant to the point being made here. An
important cost of using the ultra vires doctrine based on legislative
intent is to conceal the true policy considerations which affect the
law in this area.
III. THE DEFENCE OF THE ULTRA VIRES PRINCIPLE: MEETING THE
OBJECTIONS
Christopher Forsyth does not merely point out what he perceives to
be the dangers of abandoning the ultra vires doctrine. He also seeks
to meet some of the objections which have been put in the first
section of this article. Two arguments are advanced in this respect,
one particular, the other general. They will be considered in turn.
32 The relevant case law can be found in Craig, op. cit. n. 10, Chap. 10, fns. 33 and 34.
3 Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube, "The 'Ebb' and 'Flow' of Administrative Law on the
'General Question of Law'", in Taggart (ed.), The Province of Administrative Law (1997),
308-330; Craig, "Jurisdiction, Judicial Control and Agency Autonomy", in Loveland (ed.),
A Special Relationship: American Influences on Public Law in the UK (1995), Chap. 7.
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(a) The Particular Defence: The Exercise of Power by
Non-Statutory Bodies
Forsyth concedes that the ultra vires doctrine cannot explain all
instances in which the courts exercise the power of judicial review.
He accepts that "it is not meaningful, when a body lacks legal
power, to talk about it acting in excess of its legal powers", and that
therefore "some juridical basis, other than the doctrine of ultra vires,
is needed to justify judicial intervention in such cases".34 Forsyth is
willing to accept that this juridical basis can be found in the common
law. He draws upon work, including that of the present author,35
which has shown that the common law imposed a duty to price
reasonably on those who exercised monopoly power, even where that
power existed de facto rather than de jure. Forsyth then seeks to
generalise from this case law in order to sustain the proposition that
the common law should impose a more general duty to act
reasonably on such bodies, which would include an obligation not to
act irrationally or to abuse their powers. 6
It would be surprising, given the views which I have expressed
earlier, if I were to object to this line of argument. I do not, although
there is considerable room for discussion as to which types of bodies
should be subject to public law principles in this manner, and also
as to which principles of public law should be applied to them. This
is not the place for detailed discussion of such matters and my own
views can be found elsewhere.37
The following point is however of direct relevance to the present
debate. Forsyth remains firmly of the belief that the ultra vires
principle based on legislative intent should retain its central position
so far as decisions made under statutory powers are concerned.38 If
we were to accept this view then we should be very clear of the
consequences. We would be saying that the heads of review which
could apply to bodies which do and which do not derive their power
from statute would be generally the same, but that the conceptual
basis for such review powers would be strictly distinguished. In
relation to the former type of body, the traditional ultra vires
doctrine would continue to provide that justification. In relation to
the latter type of body, we would be willing to ground such controls
on the common law's capacity to control public power.
This dichotomy does little service to a rational system of
4 Forsyth, op. cit. n. 1, p. 124
Craig, "Constitutions, Property and Regulation" [1991] P.L. 538.
Forsyth, op. cit. n. 1, p. 125.
97 Craig, "Public Law and Control over Private Power", in Taggart (ed.), 7he Province of
Administrative Law (1997), pp. 196-216.
9' Forsyth, op. cit. n. I, p. 126.
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public law. This is in part for empirical reasons, in that the very
dividing line between bodies which do and do not derive their power
from statute can be difficult to draw. It is in part for conceptual
reasons, in that it begs the central question: if the common law is to
be regarded as the legitimate basis for controls on bodies which do
not depend on statute for their powers, why then cannot it be so
regarded for bodies which do derive their powers from statute? This
question will be addressed in the final section of this article.
(6) The General Defence: Tacit Consent and Legislative Delegation
to the Judiciary
Christopher Forsyth also seeks to reconcile the broader criticisms of
the ultra vires principle with orthodoxy. He accepts that judicial
review is a judicial creation. He recognises that the implied intent of
the legislature cannot plausibly provide any significant guidance as
to "the reach of the rules of natural justice or the fine distinctions to
be drawn between decisions that are unreasonable but not irrational
and the like".39 He argues however that these judicial developments
did not take place in a constitutional vacuum, but rather against the
background of a sovereign legislature that "could have intervened at
any moment", and sometimes did.4" The fact that it generally did not
do so is taken by Forsyth to be tacit approval by the legislature of
the principles of judicial review, subject to the recognition of
legislative supremacy. While the implied intent of the legislature
cannot therefore provide the key to the precise application of the
rules of natural justice, reasonableness etc. which will apply in a
particular case, "the legislature is taken to have granted an
imprimatur to the judges to develop the law in the particular area". 4
Proponents of the traditional ultra vires doctrine pay a heavy
price for this mode of reconciliation. It is accepted that legislative
intent provides no sure guide as to the precise application of the
heads of review in a particular case. It is acknowledged that the
general meaning to be ascribed to an established head of review,
such as jurisdictional error, is similarly to be decided by the judiciary.
It would seem also to follow that legislative intent can furnish no
adequate explanation for the introduction of a new head of review
at a particular time. In truth, this mode of reconciliation robs the
traditional orthodoxy of virtually' all content. On this view the only
relevance of legislative intent comes in the form of tacit approval by
the legislature for the principles of judicial review developed by the
courts and tacit consent for the continuance of this judicial role. On
3 Ibid. p. 134.




this interpretation the ultra vires doctrine becomes a mere shadow of
its former self, capable only of performing a residual role by
implicitly legitimating what the courts have chosen to do, while being
incapable of providing any more specific guidance.
Even this residual role can be questioned. While Parliament could
in theory choose to intervene and overturn a development of which
it disapproved, thereby giving positive life to the residual notion of
legislative intent, this could be more difficult than might initially be
imagined. If the courts were, for example, to recognise proportionality
as an independent head of review, and the legislature disapproved of
this step, could the legislature enact a general statute which
prohibited its use? In theory yes, subject of course to more general
discussion of the sovereignty of Parliament. But even accepting
traditional notions of sovereignty can one realistically imagine such
a statute being drafted and enacted?
IV. THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The discussion thus far has been concerned with the current debate
concerning the relevance of the ultra vires doctrine as the foundation
for judicial review. This section of the article will seek to broaden
the discussion both historically and conceptually. It will be argued
that in historical terms judicial review was not originally founded on
the idea of effectuating legislative intent, and that this only became
a central focus in the nineteenth century. The analysis will then shift
to the conceptual level, and it will be argued that there are valid
reasons for basing the principles of judicial review on a common law
foundation.
(a) The Historical Perspective
The very meaning of the ultra vires doctrine is more complex than
often thought and the foundations for judicial review have varied
across time. This will become apparent from the historical discussion.
It may be helpful at the outset to exemplify this in a modern context
before considering the historical materials.
The decision of the House of Lords in Page42 is cited by those
who seek to defend the ultra vires doctrine as support for their
position. 3 Lord Browne-Wilkinson who gave the leading judgment
based the court's power squarely on the ultra vires principle. His
Lordship stated that Anisminic44 had rendered obsolete the distinction
42 [1993] A.C. 682.
4' Forsyth, op. cit. n. 1, p. 123.
- [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
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between errors of law on the face of the record and other errors of
law and that it had done this by extending the ultra vires doctrine.
Thenceforth it was to be taken that "Parliament had only conferred
the decision-making power on the basis that it was to be exercised
on the correct legal basis"45 with the consequence that a misdirection
in law when making the decision rendered the decision ultra vires.
This passage clearly does provide support for the ultra vires doctrine
as articulated earlier: judicial review is explicitly posited on the
assumption that Parliament intended that all errors of law should be
open to challenge. A rather different reading of the ultra vires
doctrine is however to be found but a page later in Lord Browne-
Wilkinson's judgment. His Lordship was once again considering the
rationale for judicial control over all errors of law, in order to
determine whether the same degree of control should be applied to a
University Visitor. Here a rather different meaning was ascribed to
the ultra vires doctrine.46
... the constitutional basis of the courts' power to quash is that
the decision of the inferior tribunal is unlawful on the grounds
that it is ultra vires. In the ordinary case, the law applicable to
a decision made by such a body is the general law of the land.
Therefore, a tribunal or inferior court acts ultra vires if it
reaches its conclusion on a basis erroneous under the general
law.
On its face this dictum provides a different foundation for judicial
review: ultra vires is equated with the general law of the land, which
clearly includes the common law. On this view the ultra vires
doctrine is no longer based exclusively on legislative intent. It simply
becomes the vehicle through which the common law courts develop
their controls over the administration. Whether Lord Browne-
Wilkinson actually intended this result is unclear.
What is clear is that uncertainty as to the precise foundation of
the courts' review powers is not new and that the effectuation of
legislative intent was not an important feature in this respect until
the nineteenth century.
The history of judicial review is inextricably bound up with the
development of remedies as opposed to the creation of new heads of
review. The elaboration of grounds for review took place within, and
was framed by, the evolution of adjectival law. We must therefore
look to the prerogative writs in order to understand the foundations
of judicial review. Space precludes a detailed analysis of this topic
which could easily occupy a book let alone an article. The established
' [1993] A.C. 682, 701.
16 Ibid. p. 702F.
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case law and literature" can none the less be drawn on to provide a
general picture.
Mandamus was the earliest of the prerogative writs to be
transformed into a more general purpose tool for the remedying of
administrative error. Bagg's case48 was the seminal judgment in this
respect. Henderson captures the importance and novelty of the
decision. 9 A "writ of restitution" existed prior to Bagg's case. Its
primary focus was, however, to protect the privilege of a claimant
who had been deprived of an office so as to ensure that he or she
could consult with a King's Bench counsel. If such a person was
therefore arrested while attempting to exercise this right a writ would
be sought to command the prison to release the person thus detained.
By 1613-15 the writ had been transformed and Bagg's case was of
central importance in this respect. The colourful case concerned the
disenfranchisement of James Bagg who had been a burgess of
Plymouth. He had made a succession of abusive comments about
the mayor and other burgesses. Coke in the King's Bench found
for Bagg: the offensive words were an insufficient cause for
disenfranchisement from a freehold office. This conclusion on the
facts was buttressed by a more important finding as to the general
jurisdiction of King's Bench. It was held that this court had the
authority "not only to correct errors in judicial proceedings, but
other errors and misdemeanors extra-judicial, tending to the breach
of the peace, or oppression of the subjects, or to the raising of
faction, controversy, debate or to any manner of misgovernment; so
that no wrong or injury, either public or private, can be done but
that it shall be (here) reformed or punished by due course of law"."
The decision was of far reaching importance both in terms of the
development of the remedy itself, and also because of the types of
error which were now said to be reviewable. Henderson captures the
former point well."
... by 1613-15 a new writ had appeared with a definite though
potentially very flexible form. Moreover, by this writ King's
Bench did something quite different from its traditional activities.
It was not addressed to the sheriff or any other law enforcement
official ... Nor was it directed to other judicial authority like
the writs of prohibition, error and some of the medieval forms
of certiorari. By this new writ a public official outside the normal
Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law (1963); Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and
Illegality (1965); de Smith, "The Prerogative Writs" [1951] C.L.J. 40 and "Wrongs and Remedies
in Administrative Law" (1952) M.L.R. 189; Jaffe and Henderson, "Judicial Review and the
Rule of Law: Historical Origins" (1956) 72 L.Q.R. 345.
41 (1615) 11 Co. Rep. 93b.
"' Henderson, op. cit. n. 47, pp. 46-58.
50 (1615) 11 Co. Rep. 93b, 98a.
SI Henderson, op. cit. n. 47, pp. 61-62. Italics in the original.
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law enforcement system was required to do something ... All
this was a very far-reaching departure from tradition. Yet as
may be seen, the writ as it was now worded said nothing to
explain why King's Bench could do this, beyond the bare
generality that an injustice had been done and that it ought to
be set right.
The significance of the latter point, the scope of errors which
King's Bench could address, was not lost on those who read the
judgment. Thus in the Observations on the Lord Coke's Reports Lord
Ellesmere, 2 having noted that the case was simply concerned with
the legality of removal from an office, had this to say about the
broader dicta concerning the scope of the King's Bench power.5 3
Herein (giving excess of authority to K.B.) he hath as much as
insinuated that this Court is all-sufficient in itself to manage the
State; for if the King's Bench may reform any manner of
misgovernment (as the words are) it seemeth that there is little
or no use either of the King's Royal care and authority exercised
in his person, and by his proclamations, ordinances, and
immediate directions, nor of the council table, which under the
King is the chief watch tower for all points of government and
besides the words do import as if the King's Bench had a
superintendency over the government itself, and to judge wherein
any of them do misgovern.
Theoretical justification for the expansive power arrogated by King's
Bench was not immediately forthcoming. We can none the less draw
some conclusions both negative and positive from the existing
materials.
In negative terms, there was no attempt to legitimate this exercise
of judicial power by reference to ultra vires in the sense of legislative
intent, howsoever it might be defined. This is clear in part because
of the very absence of any such indication in the judgment of Bagg's
case which might suggest this as the foundation for review. This
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Parliament was not at this
time the fount of all authority. Power was divided between the King
and Parliament, and it was to take a civil war and consequent
settlement before it would even begin to become meaningful to speak
of a Parliament which had truly sovereign capacity in the modern
sense of the term. Yet one suspects that even if Parliament had
attained this status at the time of Bagg's case it would not have
suited Coke's temperament and intellectual leanings to rest judicial
review on the foundation of legislative intent. It is of course true
that Coke was a real supporter of Parliament in its struggles with
32 The observations are attributed to Lord Ellesmere, although Henderson, op. cit. n. 47, p. 70,
questions whether he was indeed the author.
s The quotation can be found in (1615) 11 Co. Rep. 93b, 98a fn. B.
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the King, as manifested in the seminal decisions concerning the
prerogative.54 Yet his enduring belief was in the power of the
common law itself. Given that this was so, it is doubtful in
the extreme if Coke would have been content to rest judicial
intervention on the vindication of Parliamentary intent.
One hundred and fifty years later the "parties" have changed but
the story remained the same. Parliament's position had improved
considerably during this time, although the monarch still exercised
real power. The leading judicial decisions declined none the less to
rest review powers on ideas of legislative intent. What was true of
Coke in this respect was true also of Mansfield. It was Lord
Mansfield in R. v. Barker" who produced the seminal eighteenth
century rationalisation of mandamus.
The original nature of the writ, and the end for which it was
framed, direct upon what occasions it should be used. It was
introduced, to prevent disorder from a failure of justice, and
defect of police. Therefore it ought to be used upon all occasions
where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in
justice and good government there ought to be one.
Nor should we forget in this respect that even in the nineteenth
century, when it was more common for judges to invoke legislative
intent as the justification for review, there were still notable instances
where the courts would honestly admit that the common law was
supplying the omission of the legislature.56
In positive terms a number of possible justifications for the newly
created judicial power were advanced. Coke himself sought to rest it
in part upon Magna Carta and the protections for freehold offices
derived therefrom, although as Henderson has pointed out it was by
no means self-evident that a municipal alderman did possess such a
freehold in his office.57 More generally, Coke advanced a theory of
delegation, whereby the King was taken to have committed all his
judicial power to the courts, including in this respect the power to
do justice.5" There are however both empirical and conceptual
difficulties with this explanation.59 In truth, we would do well to pay
attention to the actual language used by both Coke and Mansfield,
and to acknowledge that both jurists based their conclusions on the
capacity of the common law to control governmental power. Indeed,
Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 12 Co. Rep. 63; Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co. Rep. 74. For
a discussion see, Craig, "Prerogative, Precedent and Power", in Forsyth and Hare (eds.) The
Golden Metwand and the Crooked Cord (1998), 65-90.
"(1762) 3 Burr. 1265, 1267.
56 Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180.
57 Henderson, op. cit. n. 47, pp. 77-78.
's Coke, The Fourth Part of the Ilstitutes ofthe Laws of England (1648), p. 71, cited by Henderson,
op. cit. n. 47, pp. 70-71. See also, Jaffe and Henderson, op. cit. n. 47, p. 361.
59 Henderson, op. cit. n. 47, pp. 71-72.
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as Jaffe and Henderson aptly remark,6" Coke's doctrine of irrevocable
delegation was in truth but a corollary of "his boldest and most
spacious notion", the autonomy of the common law. This conceptual
justification for judicial review will be considered more fully below.
The evolution of certiorari into a generalised remedy capable of
catching a variety of governmental errors was to post-date the
developments in mandamus which have been charted above. While
there was therefore a temporal difference in the elaboration of the
remedies, the conceptual foundation for the expansion in the remit
of certiorari paralleled that which we have identified in the context
of mandamus.
Certiorari certainly existed during the medieval period, and was
used for many purposes, most notably as a means for calling up the
record on a particular matter. Certiorari to quash emerged rather
later. The judgment in Commins v. Massam6 was of central
importance. It arose out of a decision by the Commissioners for
Sewers to charge the cost of repairs to a sea wall to the lessee of the
land. The court was divided as to whether certiorari would lie or
not. Mallett J. was of the view that it would not, but Heath J. and
Bramston C.J. held to the contrary. Heath J. was firmly of the
opinion that certiorari would lie since there was no court which
could not be corrected by King's Bench.62 It seems that this newly
created remedy of certiorari to quash was originally only available
against courts of record.63 It was Holt C.J. who built on these
foundations to fashion a remedy of more wide ranging application.
In the Cardiff Bridge case64 he held that certiorari would lie whenever
a new jurisdiction was created, whether by private or public Act of
Parliament. This same theme was developed in Groenvelt v. Burwell65
where Holt C.J. held that where any court was created by statute,
certiorari would lie, for it was a consequence of all jurisdictions to
have their proceedings examined by King's Bench. Moreover, although
the statute did not "give authority to this Court to grant a certiorari",
this was not conclusive since "it is by the common law that this
Court will examine if other Courts exceed their jurisdictions".66
The concept of jurisdiction was then to be the touchstone through
which King's Bench controlled the inferior bodies which it had
bought within its purview. This is not the place for any general
6 Op. cit. n. 47, p. 362.
61 (1643) March N.C. 196.
62 Ibid. p. 197.
13 Henderson, op. cit. n. 47, p. 112.
'4 (1700) 1 Ld. Raym. 580.
65 (1700) 1 Ld. Raym. 454.
66 Ibid. p. 469.
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exegesis on the meaning ascribed by the courts to jurisdiction. This
can be found elsewhere.67 What is of importance for the purposes of
the present discussion is to be clear how far the particular meaning
accorded to jurisdiction was determined by reference to legislative
intent, and how far it was the result of a choice made by the
reviewing court of its own volition in the exercise of its inherent
common law power.
There is no doubt that in one sense the determination of
jurisdiction must necessarily make reference to the enabling
legislation. It is only by doing so that one can begin to determine
the ambit of authority given to any particular body. In this sense the
legislation provides a necessary focus for judicial review. This bears
out the point made earlier, that those who are opposed to the
traditional ultra vires doctrine as the basis for judicial review, none
the less accept that the enabling legislation will always be of
relevance.68 There is however a world of difference between
acknowledging that the legislation is of relevance in this respect, and
accepting that the intent of the legislature can provide any real
guidance as to, for example, the scope of jurisdictional error or the
types of control which should exist over the exercise of discretion.
It is clear that the varying answers which were given to these
latter questions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not
generally based upon legislative intent. Nor was any general theory
of jurisdiction provided by Coke, Blackstone or Hale.69 It was left to
individual courts to reach decisions which they felt expressed the
appropriate standard to be imposed pursuant to the common law
power of judicial review. Not surprisingly views differed on this, in
much the same manner as they do in the modern day. Some such as
Heath J. in Commins" expressly acknowledged that the court could
intervene to examine jurisdiction and not justice, but then so applied
jurisdiction so as to embrace in effect any error of law. Others, such
as those who gave judgment in Woodsterton,7" construed the concept
of jurisdiction more narrowly. It is in the nineteenth century that we
begin to see the courts more commonly seeking to justify their
chosen interpretations of jurisdiction by reference to legislative intent,
in order thereby to imbue them with greater legitimacy.72 Yet as we
have already seen, it was the very malleability of legislative intent
which rendered it capable of legitimating virtually any of the chosen
67 Craig, op. cit. n. 2, chap. 10; Rubinstein, op. cit. n. 47; Henderson, op. cit. n. 47.
68 See above, pp. 65-66.
9 Henderson, op. cit. n. 47, pp. 126-127.
70 (1643) March N.C. 196.
7' (1733) 2 Barnard K.B. 207.
See above, n. 11.
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meanings of jurisdiction adopted by the courts, thereby robbing it of
the capacity to legitimate any particular one.
(b) The Conceptual Perspective
We have already seen that proponents of the traditional ultra vires
doctrine defend it on the ground, inter alia, that it legitimates judicial
review, by making it referable to Parliamentary intent. They question
whether any other conceptual justification for the courts' powers of
judicial review could be found, and maintain this position even while
acknowledging some of the shortcomings of the ultra vires doctrine.
This is an important argument which must be directly addressed.
The most dramatic way of doing so is, of course, to attack the
foundations of the argument directly, by challenging established
ideas of Parliamentary supremacy. This is a possible line of argument
and as indicated earlier I believe that there are indeed strong reasons
for rethinking traditional ideas of Parliamentary supremacy. The
justifications for altering our constitutional foundations must however
be addressed in their own right, and the detailed historical, legal and
conceptual parts of the analysis cannot be examined here. 3
It will however be argued that a sound conceptual foundation for
judicial review can be found even if Parliamentary supremacy
remains unaltered. The essence of the argument can be put quite
simply.
It is common for lawyers to think in the pigeon-holes represented
by their specialty. We all try to compensate for this and broaden our
horizons, but exigencies of time and the growing sophistication of
differing legal disciplines render this increasingly difficult. Testing the
fundamental assumptions which underlie one area against accepted
judicial behaviour in other areas can however be rewarding. This is
particularly true when we consider public and private law. Important
work has been done on the differences and similarities between the
two fields, but a significant difference has not been noted.
In public law, the view is, as we have seen, that controls on
public power must be legitimated by reference to legislative intent.
In private law, there is no such assumption. It is accepted that
constraints on the exercise of private power can and have been
developed by the common law in and of itself, and that there are
numerous examples of this in contract, tort, restitution and property
law.74
See above, n. 5.
4 In the law of tort see, e.g., the economic torts which place limitations on the legitimate scope
of competitive activity in the market place or the way in which the courts have limited the
volenti doctrine so as to render it inapplicable where real free choice is not available. In the law
of contract see, e.g., the common law rules which condition the acceptability of exemption
clauses, or the rules concerning illegality which relate to the restraint of trade doctrine. In the
law of restitution see, e.g., doctrines such as duress. On some occasions, limits are rationalised
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When we consider the matter in this light the historical material
considered above appears less surprising. The absence of any formal
divide between public and private law helps us to understand why it
would not have appeared at all odd to a Coke, Heath, Holt or a
Mansfield to base judicial review on the capacity of the common law
to control public power. It is the very same absence of a formal
divide which can help us to understand the willingness of the courts
to extend common law created doctrine to bodies which possessed a
de facto monopoly.
There are consequential interesting differences in the sense of
legitimation which operates in the two areas. In public law, the
traditional ultra vires model sees legitimation in terms of the
derivation of judicial authority, flowing from legislative intent. The
prime focus is not on the content of the heads of review. We are of
course concerned about content, but this is not the primary focus
when we are thinking about the legitimacy of judicial review itself.
This is in part a consequence of the fact that, as we have seen, the
ultra vires doctrine is capable of vindicating virtually any chosen
heads of review. In private law, by way of contrast, we tend to think
of legitimation in terms of the content of the common law norm
which the courts have imposed, and more specifically about its
normative justification. We ask whether certain constraints imposed
on the exercise of private power in, for example, contract and tort,
are sensible, warranted and justified in the light of the aims of the
particular doctrinal area in question. It should be made very clear at
this juncture that no claim is being made either way as to whether
the content of the constraints imposed on public and private power
should be the same or different. It is the approach to this topic which
is in issue here.
An important consequence of conceiving of judicial review in this
manner is that it better expresses the relationship between courts and
legislature in a constitutional democracy. The fact that the legislature
could ultimately limit review, given traditional notions of sovereignty,
does not mean that the institution of review has to be legitimated by
reference to legislative intent in the absence of any such limits being
imposed. The constitution assigns a role to the courts as well as
the legislature. This latter point has been powerfully captured by
Professor Wade. 5
by reference to the supposed intent of the parties, on others the courts will openly impose
the limits. It is of course the case that Parliament could overrule common law norms created
by the courts related to private law. This does not alter the point being made in the text: neither
the courts, nor writers seek to deny that some of these controls are common law creations in
the manner described above.
7 Constitutional Fundamentals, op. cit. n. 26, p. 70.
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If we respect what little is left of our own constitution, it ought
not to be left to Whitehall to say how much judicial control
they will or will not tolerate. It is just as much for the judges to
say how much abuse of power they will or will not tolerate.
This is the part that the constitution assigns to them and they
should be allowed to play it, free from threats and accusations
and without talk of government by judges.
The challenge can then be presented squarely. Why is it that
some now feel that judicial review can only be properly grounded on
legislative intent, given that this was not felt to be so for public law
by earlier jurists, and given also that controls on private power are
not perceived to operate in this manner? Three different answers
might be suggested.
The first possible response is that we must preserve the ultra vires
doctrine since we would otherwise encounter problems with ouster
clauses and be faced with analytical difficulties. This argument has
been addressed above.76
The second is that to rest judicial review on the common law
would still constitute a challenge to sovereignty, since these controls
on the exercise of public power would always be operative. This will
not withstand examination. There is nothing in principle inconsistent
in positing the existence of judicial review on the capacity of the
common law to control public power, while accepting at the same
time that Parliament might, with sufficiently clear words etc., limit
such common law constraints. In historical terms it has been
convincingly argued that this is in fact what Coke had in mind in
Dr. Bonham's Case,7" rather than the more radical idea of overturning
legislation.78 Even when construed in this manner Coke's doctrine
did lay the foundation for a "highly autonomous and powerful
judiciary", which would insist that "legislation would be interpreted
in the light of 'reason' and the 'common law', that official action
would be subject to legal control, and that the authority of courts
would be accepted by Parliament and Crown".79
The third possible argument is that we must preserve the idea of
ultra vires based on legislative intent, since otherwise there would be
no limits as to the types of common law constraints which the courts
could impose. Even leaving aside the residual capacity of Parliament
to intervene, this argument is still open to two counter objections.
On the one hand, the ultra vires doctrine itself has never, as we have
seen, provided any meaningful guidance concerning the heads of
review, their limits or their precise content. On the other hand, if we
" See above, pp. 71-75.
71 (1610) 8 Co.Rep. 107.
71 Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (1955), pp. 43-45.
71 Jaffe and Henderson, op. cit. n. 47, p. 362.
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accept that such review powers rest on the common law we can then
employ the same approach which we bring to bear in the context of
private law. The focus would be where it ought to be, on the
existence of a reasoned justification, which was acceptable in
normative terms, for the particular head of review which was in
question. Thus, for example, rather than "justifying" a particular
reading of jurisdictional error by reference to legislative intent, there
should instead be a reasoned argument as to why this view of
jurisdictional error was felt to be correct.
V. CONCLUSION
Debate about the foundations of a body of law is important in any
legal system. This is especially so in relation to public law, given the
importance of the subject matter. Few would doubt that a democratic
polity requires some measure of judicial review. For some the
primary focus may be on the need to constrain public power. For
others it may be directed towards ensuring that affected interests are
represented in the administrative process. Other views are clearly
possible.
When we think about the foundations for this body of law we
should be mindful of the analytic consequences of adopting a
particular view, and mindful also of our historical heritage. Both
have been addressed in this article. Christopher Forsyth is clearly
correct to point out the analytic consequences which have, for
example, attended the demise of the ultra vires doctrine in South
Africa. We do however differ markedly as to whether these are
necessary or even likely results of departing from established
orthodoxy. Our historical heritage is equally important. An
appreciation of the historical foundations for judicial review can
prevent a potent form of "temporal parochialism". It can help us to
understand that the orthodoxy of today is less permanent and more
ephemeral than might have been imagined. The ultra vires doctrine
conceived in terms of legislative intent, which is now regarded as the
unshakeable foundation for review, would never have appeared so to
Coke, Heath, Holt or Mansfield, nor to many of the other judges
who participated in the development of review during this period.
There is little doubt but that these judges would have felt more at
home with the vision of dual constitutionalism or bi-polar sovereignty
articulated by Sir Stephen Sedley,8" and also with the autonomous
capacity of the common law to develop review advanced in the work
of Sir John Laws.81 Important traces of similar ideas are also to be
80 "Human Rights: A Twenty-First Century Agenda" [1995] P.L. 386.
8 See above, nn. 2 and 14.
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found in the work of those associated with the traditional ultra vires
doctrine, such as Professor Wade.82
There is no doubt that the institution of judicial review must be
justified, as too must the heads of review and the particular meaning
accorded to them. The ultra vires doctrine conceived in terms of
legislative intent cannot provide this. We should recognise what was
self-evident to our intellectual ancestors that review is the creation of
the common law. We should recognise also that the ambit of review
can only be legitimated in the same way as other common law
powers, by asking whether there is a reasoned justification which is
acceptable in normative terms for the controls which are being
imposed. The institution of judicial review both demands and
deserves legitimation in this manner. This is the proper way to
conceive of judicial review in a constitutional democracy.
82 Constitutional Fundamentals, op. cit. n. 26, pp. 66, 68, 70-71.
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